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Abstract 
 The paper presents evidence from UK rights issues on the discounts at which 
large blocks of new shares plus rights are sold. The shares are renounced by the 
shareholders entitled to them and placed with passive investors at substantial 
discounts of around 8% to the expected ex-rights midpoint price of the existing 
shares. Tests indicate that the discounts arise because of uncertainty about 
issuer value and inelastic demand for the shares rather than because the issuing 
companies are overvalued. The finding that selling renounced shares is costly 
removes an apparent advantage of rights issues compared with open offers and 
private placings. 
 Keywords: rights issues; open offers; private placings; offer-price discounts; 
long-run abnormal returns. 
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Discounts in placing pre-renounced shares in rights issues 
1. Introduction 
 Until the 1990s rights issues were the dominant method by which UK listed 
companies issued new shares. But the use of rights issues has fallen since 1990 in favour of 
open offers. There are now (2006) only about 20 rights issues a year compared with an 
average of 132 rights issues a year during 1980-89.1 The reasons for this change in issue 
practice are not fully understood. The current paper presents evidence that an apparent 
advantage of rights issues is illusory in many cases, especially issues by smaller companies 
with illiquid shares. The evidence does not establish that open offers are superior, but it does 
indicate that many open offers that might appear to have been more costly than the equivalent 
rights issue were not, in fact, more costly. 
 In a rights issue the new shares are issued pro rata to the existing shareholders, 
normally at a discount to the market price of around 15% to 20%. Shareholders who do not 
wish to take up their rights to the new shares can sell them. The offer period lasts for three 
weeks and the shares go ex-rights (cease to carry an entitlement to participate in the offer) at 
the start of this period. Although the share price will fall on the ex-rights day, due to the scrip 
effect of the discount, the ability to sell the rights means that the discount is not thought to 
impose a cost on non-subscribing shareholders. 
 In an open offer the shares are privately placed before the offer is publicly announced. 
They are then offered pro rata to the existing shareholders, as in a rights issue, but the 
shareholders can not sell their entitlements. The new shares not taken up by the existing 
shareholders are bought by the placees already arranged by the start of the offer period. The 
                                                 
1 Source: London Stock Exchange website, Historic Statistics file. It is not clear from the data files on 
the Exchange’s website how many open offers there are per year, as the term is not used in the files. 
But examination of seasoned offer prospectuses shows that open offers have largely replaced rights 
issues for larger offers, exceeding 5% of the issuer’s existing equity. Issues smaller than 5% are 
usually made via a private placing. 
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discount is normally less than 10%; smaller than in a rights issue. But because the 
entitlements can not be sold, a discount means that wealth is transferred to the placees from 
the non-subscribing shareholders. For a typical open offer of one new share for every three 
existing shares, with an offer price at a discount to the market price of 8.0%, the loss per 
existing share for a non-subscribing shareholder is 2.0% of the share price, other things 
equal.2 Thus, an open offer at a discount appears to be a bad choice compared with a rights 
issue, for non-subscribing shareholders. 
 However, the advantage of a rights issue as just described relies on an implicit 
assumption that the transaction cost of selling rights is unimportant. If the cost were zero, the 
market price of the right to a new share, Pright, would be given during the offer period by 
 Pright  =  Pexmid  –  Poffer;  min(Pright)  =  0 (1) 
where Pexmid is the ex-rights midpoint market price of the existing shares and Poffer is the offer 
price. If Pexmid falls below Poffer during the offer period, no shareholders will subscribe who 
have not already subscribed, and the rights will have zero value.3 
 The paper shows that substantial discounts are required to sell large blocks of newly 
issued shares in rights issues to new investors. That is, large shareholders are only able to sell 
their rights at prices well below Pexmid – Poffer. This means that equation (1) is not correct in 
practice; it substantially overstates the price at which the rights can be sold on the market.  
The evidence is from a sample of rights issues by smaller listed companies in which large 
shareholders decide to pre-renounce and place their rights. They decide before the offer is 
publicly announced not to subscribe to the new shares, and the new shares plus rights are 
privately placed with investing institutions at a common price before the offer is announced. 
                                                 
2 Assuming no change in valuation, the market price on the ex-rights day t will be given by (Pmid,t–1Nold 
+ PofferNnew)/(Nold + Nnew), where Pmid,t–1 is the midpoint price at the close of day t–1, Poffer is the offer 
price of the new shares, and  Nold (Nnew) is the number of old (new) shares. 
3 In theory equation (1) is not correct, because a right is a call option with an expiry date at the end of 
the offer period, and Pexmid – Poffer is the intrinsic value of the option only. But the time value is small 
as the offer period is three weeks at the outset, and we ignore it for simplicity. 
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The renounced blocks are very large compared with block trades of existing shares: the 
average size is 25% of the existing shares (median 13%). The placees are likely to be 
‘passive’: they are not seeking to build up large stakes for the purpose of intervening in the 
management of the company.  
 The theoretical ex-rights rights price (TERP), calculated as at the day before the 
announcement of the issue and as at the announcement day, is used to proxy for the ex-rights 
midpoint price expected to prevail at the start of the offer period. The cost per share of the 
placing is measured by the difference between the TERP and the actual price at which the 
shares plus rights were placed. The average cost of placing the pre-renounced blocks is 
between 7.6% and 9.6% of the TERP, depending on the assumptions made. It is argued that 
the decisions of the large shareholders to pre-renounce their rights show that very large blocks 
of new shares plus rights could only have been sold on the market at discounts similar to the 
discounts at which the renounced blocks were privately placed. 
 The finding that selling large blocks of shares plus rights is rather costly means that 
the apparent cost advantage of rights issues over open offers for non-subscribing large 
shareholders is illusory. The paper shows that the non-subscribers in the sample rights issue 
with the median loss per share from sale of the rights would have preferred an equivalent 
open offer made at any discount smaller than 10.0%. The discounts in a large majority of 
open offers are smaller than this.  
 The cost of selling new shares plus rights has not previously been documented as a 
material cost in rights issues. A detailed report by the UK Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission (MMC, 1999), now called the Competition Commission, notes some concerns 
about the liquidity of the market for rights but concludes that rights can be sold on the market 
without substantial cost, except in the case of very illiquid shares. Korteweg and Renneboog 
(2002) find that issuers with less liquid shares are more likely to choose an open offer, but 
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they do not measure the costs of selling rights. Hansen (1988) suggests that the transactions 
costs of selling rights in the USA were appreciable, but he does not provide direct estimates 
of these costs, and his results have been questioned by Eckbo and Masulis (1992). 
 The paper goes on to consider why selling the blocks is costly, and presents evidence 
that the most likely reasons are uncertainty about the value of the issuer and inelastic demand 
for the shares. An alternative hypothesis is that the discounts arise because the issuing 
companies are perceived by placees to be overvalued at the time of issue. But the long-run 
abnormal returns following the issues with pre-renounced shares are neither consistently 
negative nor significant, indicating that the issuers were fairly valued. The discount is 
positively related to the bid-ask spread on the share and to the number of shares renounced as 
a proportion of the existing shares. This evidence suggests that the discount is deeper for 
shares which are more difficult to value and which have relatively inelastic demand. It is in 
line with recent findings by Altinciliç and Hansen (2003) and Corwin (2003) regarding 
discounts on the offer day in US firm commitment offers. The paper argues that the cost of 
selling very large blocks of existing shares to passive investors will be similar to the cost 
reported of selling new shares plus rights.  
 The next section reviews existing research on the decline of rights issues in the USA 
and UK. Section 3 explains how data on pre-renounced shares can be used to calculate or 
infer the cost of selling blocks of new shares plus rights. Section 4 describes the sample. 
Section 5 presents and discusses the results on the cost of selling the blocks, and Section 6 
considers why this cost exists. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Problems with rights issues 
 Rights issues had virtually ceased to be made by commercial firms in the USA by the 
early 1980s, despite having been substantially cheaper, in terms of fees, than the firm 
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commitment offers which replaced them. Several problems with rights issues have been 
proposed, including the costs to issuers of distributing the rights (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992); 
loss of market value between the announcement of the offer and the start of the offer period, 
perhaps due to the expected costs of selling rights (Hansen, 1988); inducements to companies 
from investment banks to switch to firm commitments, for which higher fees are charged 
(Smith, 1977); and lower liquidity in the shares after a rights issue compared with after a firm 
commitment offer (Kothare, 1997). There is also the problem that some shareholders will face 
payments of capital gains tax on the sale of their rights. The weights to attach to these 
problems in explaining the disappearance of rights remain uncertain. 
 The decline of rights issues in the UK is more recent and has received less attention. 
Interview and survey evidence presented in MMC (1999) and Burton et al (2005) reveals no 
obvious reason for the decline, nor that there is anything seriously wrong with rights issues. 
Armitage (2000) finds no difference between the fees for rights issues and open offers, 
controlling for factors influencing the fees. Korteweg and Renneboog (2002) compare 
characteristics across firms which have chosen a rights issue and firms which have chosen an 
open offer. They find that the choice of an open offer is positively related to the proportion of 
the equity owned by directors and to growth opportunities (which imply a smaller discount for 
the open offer). The choice of open offer is negatively related to the liquidity of the shares. 
They suggest that this is because the pressure of a large supply of rights on the market will 
depress the rights price, increasing the attraction of an open offer. 
 Barnes and Walker (2006) study the choice between rights issues and private placings. 
The latter differ from open offers in that the shares in a private placing are not offered pro rata 
to existing shareholders. Thus any discount hurts the existing shareholders, since they can not 
subscribe unless they are placees. Placings, like open offers, have become more common in 
the UK, partly because the Stock Exchange allowed placings in excess of £15m after January 
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1996. The authors find that placings are chosen for relatively small issues in relation to firm 
size, and by firms with relatively high levels of director ownership and information 
asymmetry. They also find that placings are made at smaller discounts to the pre-
announcement market price than are rights issues.4  
 The MMC report (1999) notes the views of some brokers that illiquid shares ‘tended 
to trade down to a level close to the offer price’ during the offer period in rights issues (p. 76), 
and estimates that ‘rump’ shares plus rights not taken up by the offer close are sold at an 
average discount to the market price of the old shares of 1%. The report also includes a 
summary of a study of the market prices of rights by Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB). The 
sample is all rights issues with a value in excess of £50m during 1995-97. The prices of the 
rights are midpoint prices at the close of trading each day, not the prices of actual trades of 
rights. The study finds that, on average, the midpoint price of a right is 0.5% below the price 
that would be expected if equation (1) held exactly. The conclusion of CSFB is therefore that 
rights trade at approximately their fair price, and this is also the MMC’s conclusion, except 
regarding ‘very illiquid shares’ (p. 40). But the use of midpoint prices means that the CSFB 
study is uninformative about the transaction prices at which large blocks of rights are sold. 
The exclusion of smaller issues, below £50m, means that the sample will have included few 
issues by smaller listed companies with relatively illiquid shares (only 8% of the issues 
studied in the current paper are larger than £50m). Also, the largest blocks will have been pre-
renounced in some issues, removing most of the selling volume from the market during the 
offer period in these issues. 
                                                 
4 Although a smaller discount implies a greater probability that the issue is a placing (or an open offer, 
for that matter), the discount is unlikely to be set independently of the choice of issue method. This is 
because the choice of issue method affects the impact of the discount. So long as the rights have a 
positive value in a rights issue, a given discount will cause less loss of wealth to non-subscribers, and 
provide less reward to buyers of the new shares, if the issue is a rights issue than if it is a private 
placing or open offer. 
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 The MMC report is more concerned with the problem that selling rights can cause the 
seller to pay capital gains tax than with the market for rights. An open offer avoids the tax 
problem. Another comparative disadvantage for a rights issue is that it will be two or three 
weeks slower than an open offer if an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) is required to 
authorise the issue of the new shares. The EGM, if needed, can be held after the offer period 
in an open offer, but must be held before the offer period in a rights issue to authorise the 
issue of tradable provisional allotment letters (PALs) nil-paid (ie rights). In open offers 
existing shareholders are invited to subscribe to the new shares but they do not receive PALs 
and hence they have no tradable instrument representing their entitlement.  
Finally, there has been found to be a negative market reaction on average to rights 
issues and a positive reaction to open offers and private placings. In addition, long-run 
abnormal returns measured up to five years after the issue are negative for rights issues and 
positive for open offers (Capstaff et al, 2006). The reasons are uncertain, but one suggestion is 
that there is superior certification of value by the underwriter (Slovin et al, 2000) or by 
placees (Armitage, 2002) compared with the certification in a rights issue, leading ‘high 
quality’ (undervalued) firms to select open offers and placings. However, this suggestion does 
not explain why rights issues have become scarce in the UK. 
  The current paper provides direct evidence on the cost of selling shares plus rights that 
is so far lacking in the above research. The evidence provides support for the suggestions of 
Hansen (1988) and Korteweg and Renneboog (2002) that the cost of selling rights is a 
material cost of the rights issue method for issues with large non-subscribing shareholders. 
 
3. Method 
 The prospectuses of about 35% of rights issues in the 1990s include a statement in the 
letter from the Chair of the Board that one or more shareholders has undertaken not to 
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subscribe to some or all of the shares to which they are entitled. We refer to such shares as 
pre-renounced shares. If the pre-renounced shares sum to a proportion greater than 25% of the 
issue, the shares and the rights to them are normally privately placed with investors before the 
offer is announced. The alternative for a non-subscriber is to sell the rights on the market via 
the normal process during the offer period. The normal process is to sell the rights to a market 
maker via a broker. The London Stock Exchange introduced an electronic order book in 1997 
but the shares of the companies in our sample were not liquid enough to have been traded via 
the order book. 
 In the case of a company listed on the Main Market of the Exchange, the conditions of 
Listing Rule 4.17 apply to pre-renounced shares which are privately placed: 
 (a) the placing must relate to at least 25% of the maximum number of securities 
offered, or such lesser amount as may be agreed by the UK Listing Authority if it 
is satisfied that a requirement of at least 25% would be detrimental to the success 
of the issue; 
 (b) the placees must be committed to take up whatever is placed with them; 
 (c) the price paid by the placees must not exceed the price at which the securities 
the subject of the rights issue are offered by more than one half of the ... 
difference between the offer price and the theoretical ex-rights price ... 
(Listing Rules, 2002). The same conditions were in force throughout the sample period. The 
Listing Rules do not apply to companies listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) 
or, before April 1995, on the Unlisted Securities Market (USM). One fifth of the sample was 
listed on the USM or AIM, but the practice regarding pre-renounced shares appears to have 
been the same as for Main Market companies. 
 In many cases the placing price of the rights, Pright, is stated in the prospectus. In the 
remaining cases the regulatory maximum placing price can be inferred from Rule 4.17(c). We 
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calculate TERPAD–1, the theoretical ex-rights price as at the day before the announcement of 
the issue, adjusted for the next dividend per share if the new shares are not entitled to this 
dividend:  
 TERPAD–1  =   [Pmid,AD–1Nold + (Poffer + Div)Nnew]/(Nold + Nnew) (2) 
where Pmid,AD–1 is the midpoint market price of the old shares as at the close of the day before 
the announcement, Nold is the number of old shares, Nnew is the number of new shares,5 and 
Div is the next dividend per share net of advance corporation tax if the new shares are not 
entitled to the next dividend. Div > 0 for 52% of the issues in our sample. If the placing price 
of the rights is not stated, the estimated price, Est(Pright), is given by 
 Est(Pright)  =  0.5(TERPAD–1 – Div – Poffer) (3) 
Div is subtracted from TERPAD–1 because the price of the rights will reflect whether the new 
shares are entitled to the next dividend. If the new shares are not entitled but this is ignored, 
the TERP will be lower than in equation (2) but Est(Pright) will be higher than in (3), as will 
the inferred cost of placing the new shares plus rights (equation (5) below). 
 To help understand the dividend adjustments in equations (2) and (3), consider the 
following example. Pold (cum-rights) =  £1.00, Nold  =  100 shares, Poffer  =  £0.50, Nnew  =  
100 shares and the next dividend Div  =  £0.50, to which the new shares are not entitled. On 
the ex-rights day the old shares will be worth £1.00, ie the dividend of £0.50 plus £100/200. 
Hence the expected price of the old shares ex-rights (the adjusted TERP) is £1.00, not £0.75. 
The rights will be worth nothing, although the offer price is only £0.50. Effectively the new 
shares are being offered at the same price as the old shares. 
                                                 
5 Nnew excludes any ‘vendor consideration’ shares issued to the shareholders of a company being 
acquired. These shares are not issued for cash and their value is assumed to be the same as the value of 
the existing shares, so they do not affect the TERP. Four of the rights issues were accompanied by a 
private placing of shares for cash at Poffer. These placed shares are distinct from the pre-renounced 
shares. They were not offered pro rata to existing shareholders, and were therefore not part of the 
rights issue, unlike the pre-renounced shares. The placed shares are included in Nnew for TERPAD–1 
because the price of the old shares should fall on announcement of a placing at a discount, other things 
equal, in the same way as the price should fall to the TERP on the ex-rights day in a rights issue. See, 
for example, Wruck (1989, appendix). 
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 We argue that shareholders would not choose to pre-renounce the new shares if they 
anticipate receiving a higher price from selling the rights on the market than the expected 
placing price. Therefore, the observed placing price of pre-renounced rights provides an 
estimate of the expected price at which shareholders believed the rights could have been sold 
on the market. The adjusted TERP is the expected midpoint price of the old shares ex-rights 
assuming that no change in the market price is anticipated before or on the ex-rights day other 
than a fall to reflect the scrip element in the issue. The ex-rights day is the first day on which 
the rights are traded, which is the day after the announcement or after the EGM if there is one. 
So the placing discount, the discount of Poffer + Pright or + Est(Pright) in relation to the adjusted 
TERP, is an estimate of the expected cost of selling a very large block of shares plus rights at 
the start of the offer period.6 
 The placing price of the rights may exceed the expected selling price on the market in 
some cases, implying that placing prices will tend to overstate the expected market prices. On 
the other hand, it is plausible that there is more price uncertainty in a sale of rights during the 
offer than in a placing, if only because a placing will have been completed before the offer 
period starts. The probable lower risk of a placing implies that placing prices will tend to 
understate the expected market prices. It is hard to judge which of these opposing biases is 
more important. 
 Since new and old shares are the same item, allowing for any difference in the 
dividend entitlement, and since rights are traded in the same way as shares, the midpoint price 
of a right should be close to Pexmid – Poffer. The CSFB study in MMC (1999) indicates that this 
is in fact the case, at least for liquid shares. It follows that most of the placing discount 
                                                 
6 A right is a short-horizon call option (note 3). To the extent that pre-renouncing shareholders believe 
that the market value of a right will incorporate some time value, ignoring the time value means that 
the paper underestimates the discount to expected market value at which pre-renounced rights are 
placed. But the CSFB evidence (MMC, 1999) on the market value of rights suggests that the time 
value is not material. The mean discount measured by midpoint prices is about 0.5% throughout the 
offer period and does not become deeper during the offer, as would be expected if diminishing time 
value were material. 
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reflects the anticipated transaction cost, or effective half-spread (EHS), of selling the blocks 
on the market. The EHS for a block sale at a given time is defined as 
 EHS  =  (Pexmid – Div – Pblocksell)/(Pexmid – Div) (4) 
where Pexmid is the ex-rights midpoint price of an old share and Pblocksell is the execution price 
for a seller-initiated trade of a block of shares plus rights. Our estimate of Pblocksell for very 
large blocks is Poffer + Pright or + Est(Pright). Our estimate of the expected Pexmid is TERPAD–1. 
So our estimate of the expected EHS is 
 Est(EHS)  =  Placing discount 
 =  [TERPAD–1 – Div – (Pright + Poffer)]/(TERPAD–1 – Div) (5) 
 Previous studies have found that the average abnormal return on announcement of 
rights issues is negative, as it is in our sample (Section 6.1). So it is possible that TERPAD–1 is 
an upwardly biased estimate of the expected market price of the shares when they go ex-
rights. Hence the placing discount in relation to TERPAD–1 may be an upwardly biased 
estimate of the transaction cost of selling the new shares plus rights on the market. In 
response to this point, we report the placing discount in relation to the TERP using the 
midpoint market price at the close of the announcement day (TERPAD). We also estimate the 
discount net of the fees apparently saved by pre-renouncing shares.7 
 It might appear that the estimated cost of sale relates to blocks of rights rather than to 
blocks of new shares plus rights. But the holder of a right at the end of the offer period does 
buy a new share; any rights not taken up at the offer close are sold by the broker to investors 
who buy the rights and the new shares at the same time. Any buyer of rights knows that he or 
she either will be the final holder, or will sell the rights to someone else who could be the 
                                                 
7 There is evidence from the US and UK that, on average, midpoint share prices fall during the offer 
period and then recover afterwards. A natural explanation is temporary downward pressure on prices 
during the offer, although this is questioned by Eckbo and Masulis (1992) and Singh (1997). If 
temporary price pressure is anticipated, this will account for some of the estimated EHS. But there is 
little difference for the seller between receiving a low price because the midpoint price is temporarily 
depressed and receiving a low price because the execution price of the trade is below the midpoint. 
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final holder. Thus, the prices at which block trades of rights are executed will reflect the cost 
of trading blocks of new shares and the rights to them combined. It should also be noted that a 
placee who buys a block of pre-renounced rights commits to buying the new shares to which 
the rights give entitlement (Rule 4.17(b)). The commitment to buy the new shares is 
mentioned in many of the prospectuses. 
 
4. Sample 
 A search of the prospectuses of rights issues in the 15 years between 1 January 1987 
and 31 December 2001 yielded 378 issues in which some shares were pre-renounced.8 156 of 
these issues are excluded because the prospectus does not state that the pre-renounced shares 
were privately placed. Most of the renouncements with no private placing recorded are of 
small proportions of the new shares, but in 21 cases the shares renounced are 25% or more of 
the total. A further 27 issues are excluded because it is certain or likely that the shares were 
placed with a single individual, investor group or company that was acquiring or augmenting 
a large stake in the company. In the case of a placing of a large stake with a single investor, 
the price may be influenced by the anticipated benefits of being an ‘active’ shareholder 
(Barclay et al, 2003). Our interest is in the cost of selling blocks when there is no special 
buyer, so that the placees are simply suppliers of capital. In these cases the block is placed 
with a number of ‘passive’ investing institutions each of which will be willing to hold a few 
percent of the equity at most, and will not be expecting to become involved in managing the 
company. This information comes from discussions with two fund managers (also see 
Myners, 2001, pp. 89-93, on passivity amongst UK fund managers). Finally, nine issues are 
excluded because there are insufficient data to work out TERPAD–1 or because the offer price 
                                                 
8 The sources of the prospectuses were Extel Financial, which no longer exists, and Perfect 
Information. Neither provided a comprehensive set of prospectuses for issues before 1990. 
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is uncertain because free warrants were issued as well as new shares. The final sample 
consists of 186 issues with pre-renounced shares that were privately placed. 
 
Table 1 around here 
 
 Descriptive data about the sample are shown in Table 1. Several points should be 
mentioned. First, the amounts pre-renounced represent very large blocks in relation to the size 
of the offer and to the issuer’s existing equity. The mean of the shares renounced as a 
proportion of the new shares is 42.3% (median 39.7%). In 28 issues (15% of the sample) the 
fraction pre-renounced is less than 25% of the new shares, the smallest fraction being 13.3%. 
Only five of these 28 issues are by USM or AIM companies, so it appears that exceptions to 
Rule 4.17(a) are sometimes made for companies listed on the Main Market. The mean of the 
shares renounced as a proportion of the existing shares is 24.5% (13.4%); in 96% of the 
sample the fraction renounced is at least 5% of the existing shares. 
 Second, most of the issuers in the sample are quite small, and have correspondingly 
illiquid shares. The mean market capitalisation is £61.0m (median £32.9m) and the mean half-
touch is 2.26% (1.55%). The half-touch for a share at a given time is half the bid-ask spread, 
ie 0.5(Pask – Pbid)/Pmid where Pask is the market makers’ best ask quote and Pbid is their best 
bid. It is widely used as a measure of liquidity, and it represents the cost of a trade as a 
percentage of the midpoint price, assuming that the trade is executed at the prevailing best ask 
for a buy or best bid for a sell. The mean half-touch of 2.26% compares with a mean of about 
0.4% for the largest 100 UK companies in the early 1990s and 0.5% for the next largest 250 
companies (Board and Sutcliffe, 1996. See also Reiss and Werner, 1996, for evidence that 
half-touches become much higher amongst smaller listed companies). 
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 A third point is that in most cases the pre-renouncing shareholders consist entirely or 
partly of directors, including the immediate family of a given director and trusts or companies 
controlled by the director, as recorded in the prospectus. The renouncing shareholders are 
entirely directors in 62% of the issues; they are a mixture of directors and others in a further 
29%; and they are shareholders other than directors in the remaining 9%. The latter category 
includes issues in which the prospectus says merely that the shares were renounced by 
‘certain shareholders’.  
 Nine of the sample issuers (4.8%) were in severe financial distress; the prospectus 
says they are unlikely to survive unless the issue goes ahead. Franks and Sanzhar (2005) 
report that 5.1% of 2,167 UK issuers of seasoned equity during 1989-98 were in distress, 
identified in the same manner. These data indicate that the pre-renouncement and placing of 
new shares is not a phenomenon concentrated amongst distressed issuers. 
 Most prospectuses in the sample state that the placees, the buyers of the pre-renounced 
shares plus rights, are investing institutions. Otherwise the prospectus says simply that the 
rights have been or are being placed. None of the prospectuses in the final sample discloses 
the identities or the number of the placees. 
 
5. Cost of placing pre-renounced shares plus rights 
5.1 Main results 
The main results are presented in Table 2. Panel A first shows the placing discount 
under the assumption that the expected ex-rights midpoint price of the existing shares is the 
TERP as at the close of the day before the announcement (TERPAD–1). The mean discount for 
the full sample is 8.7% (median 7.3%). The inference, according to the argument in Section 3, 
is that on average pre-renouncing shareholders expect the cost of selling the new shares plus 
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rights on the market to be 8.7% of the midpoint price of the existing shares ex-rights. In 
money terms, the mean cost of the placing discount is £612,232 (median £288,028). 
 
Table 2 and Figure 1 around here 
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of placing discounts in relation to TERPAD–1. 68% are 
clustered in a range between 3% and 9%, with most of the remainder being deeper than 9%. 
Only 5% of the discounts are smaller than 3%, and only 2% (three issues) have no discount or 
a premium. In one case the absence of a discount is because the offer price is the same as  
PAD–1 but the new shares are not entitled to the next dividend, so the offer is recorded as being 
at a premium and the rights as worth nothing. In the second case the pre-renouncing 
shareholder is HM Treasury, which, it seems, was granted special treatment in being allowed 
to place the rights at zero discount. There is no apparent reason for the small premium in the 
third case. The distribution confirms that, in issues with pre-renounced shares placed with 
passive placees, the price of the share plus right is normally set deep enough to provide the 
placees with an expected gain of several per cent. There are very few pre-renounced shares 
plus rights placed at a price at or near the TERP. 
If the new shares plus rights were expected to be sold at the best bid price for the 
existing shares, the expected EHS would be the same as the half-touch. In studies of the costs 
of trades of existing shares, the EHS is often compared with the half-touch in order to 
measure the quality of execution of the trade. Panel B of Table 2 reports the expected EHS 
expressed as a multiple of the prevailing half-touch for the existing shares. The mean multiple 
is 7.0 times (median 5.1 times) using TERPAD–1 as the expected market price. An EHS of five 
or more times the half-touch is much larger than estimates for liquid shares of the cost of 
smaller block trades of existing shares, and this point is discussed further in Section 6.4. 
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 Because the average abnormal return on announcement of rights issues is negative, 
TERPAD–1 may be viewed as an upwardly biased estimate of the expected market price of the 
shares ex-rights. So Table 2 also reports the discounts in relation to the TERP using the 
market price at the close of the announcement day (TERPAD). The mean (median) discount in 
relation to TERPAD is 8.3% (7.0%), which is 0.4 (0.3) percentage points smaller than the 
mean in relation to TERPAD–1. Thus the estimated transaction cost of selling the new shares 
plus rights is only slightly smaller when the actual post-announcement market price is used in 
the TERP. 
The placing price of the rights is stated in 131 of the prospectuses.9 The placing 
discount is deeper in this sub-sample than in the sub-sample with the rights price inferred; the 
mean (median) discount for the new shares plus rights is 9.6% (7.9%) using TERPAD–1 as the 
expected market price and 9.4% (7.6%) using TERPAD. In 104 cases the placing price for the 
rights is below the regulatory maximum placing price, given by equation (3). These include 
33 cases in which the rights were placed at a price of zero. The placing price is above the 
regulatory maximum in 18 cases, which was unexpected, though in 11 cases the excess is less 
than 5%. The advisers to the issue may have used a different market price for the old shares 
than we do to calculate TERPAD–1 and therefore to calculate the maximum placing price, or 
they may have gained permission from the Stock Exchange to exceed the regulatory 
maximum. They may also have ignored the non-entitlement of five of the new shares to the 
next dividend, which would have resulted in higher maximum placing prices for these 
shares.10 
                                                 
9 A fee payable to the broker for placing the rights is recorded in 29 cases, and we use the placing 
price net of the fee in these cases. This fee is distinct from any fee payable to the placees for buying 
the new shares, discussed below. 
10 The mean of the excesses above the regulatory maximum rights placing prices is 18.3% (median 
3.9%) of the maximum, or 2.61p (0.46p) per right. The two largest excesses are the cases, mentioned 
above, in which the seller is HM Treasury and the unexplained case in which the new share plus right 
was placed at a small premium to TERPAD–1. Excluding these two outliers, and calculating the 
maximums using TERPAD–1 ignoring non-entitlement to the next dividend, the mean of the excesses 
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The evidence from the sample of issues in which we know the rights placing price 
suggests that, for the issues in which the rights price is not stated, the inferred prices based on 
the regulatory maximums will be upwardly biased estimates of the true prices. So the mean 
and median placing discounts for the full sample are probably downwardly biased estimates 
of the true mean and median. Comparison between the sample with the rights price known 
and the sample with the rights price inferred indicates that the inferred mean (median) 
discount is underestimated by 3.1 (1.9) percentage points. But the underestimate will be less 
than this if most of the unstated rights prices are unstated because they were near the ‘default 
setting’ of the regulatory maximum. 
 A possible reason for choosing to pre-renounce shares is that the fee per new share is 
often lower for the pre-renounced shares than for other shares in the issue. The fee is lower in 
72% of the 132 issues in which sufficient detail about the fees is disclosed for the comparison 
to be made. The rights issue announced by AAF Industries plc on 1 April 1993 provides a 
typical example. The prospectus states that, in connection with the underwriting agreement,  
 the Company has agreed to pay Hoare Govett [the organising merchant bank] ... 
(i) a commission of 0.75 per cent of the value of the new Ordinary Shares at the 
issue price (ii) further commissions of 1.25 per cent of the value at the issue price 
of the new Ordinary Shares other than the Placed Shares [which had been pre-
renounced], and 0.125 per cent of the same amount for every seven days (or part 
thereof) from 1 May 1993... and (iii) 0.5 per cent of the value at the issue price of 
the Placed Shares (p. 18). 
In this case there were three extra weeks of underwriting required, costing three ‘extra 
eighths’, because an EGM had to be held after the issue had been announced and the 
                                                                                                                                                        
falls to 3.7% (1.6%) or 0.28p (0.22p) per right. Only two of the 18 issuers with a placing price above 
the maximum were not listed on the Main Market, and therefore not subject to the Exchange’s Listing 
Rule 4.17(c). 
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underwriting agreement had been signed. The total fee for the placed shares was 1.250% of 
the offer price and the total for the other new shares was 2.375%. The usual reason for the 
lower fee for the placed shares is that the fee for being a placee, 0.50% in the example, is 
smaller than the fee for being a sub-underwriter, 1.25%. But it is unclear why the fee for being 
a placee should often be smaller than the fee for being a sub-underwriter. 
 Panel C of Table 2 reports the placing discount allowing for the value of any fee saved 
by pre-renouncing the shares: 
 Placing discount  =  [TERP – Div – (Pright + Poffer) – Fee]/(TERP – Div) (6) 
where Fee = the maximum fee in pence per share on shares other than those pre-renounced, 
minus the fee on pre-renounced shares. The effect of the fee adjustment is to reduce the mean 
discount in relation to TERPAD–1 by 0.6% to 8.1% (median 6.5%). Thus, the fee savings are 
small in relation to the placing discounts, though the effect on the mean discount will be a 
little larger than has been calculated to the extent that there were fee savings in the 54 issues 
in which the savings are unknown. 
 It is possible that the fee savings are illusory, because the way that itemised fees are 
reported may bear little relation to how the total cost of the issue is determined. The total 
costs of issues are normally much higher than the reported underwriting and placing fees. In 
the AAF Industries issue, the fees relating to the underwriting agreement for all the shares 
sum to £81,538, but the total costs are £400,000. The largest item in most issues is the 
organiser’s corporate finance or advisory fee. 
 The only previous evidence on the transaction cost of selling new shares plus rights is 
in the MMC report (1999, p. 78). This states that in 68 rights issues during 1995-97 the rump 
shares plus rights not taken up by the offer close were sold at a mean discount of 1.0% in 
relation to the midpoint price at the close and 1.9% in relation to the price the day after the 
close. These discounts are considerably smaller than our estimates. The average proportion of 
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the rump shares is 8% of the new shares, much smaller than the average proportion pre-
renounced in our sample (43%), and the liquidity of the shares in the MMC sample is likely to 
have been greater. 
 
5.2 Implication for choice between rights issue and open offer 
 It was noted in the Introduction that wealth is transferred in an open offer at a discount 
from non-subscribing shareholders to buyers of the new shares. Yet in 393 open offers made 
during 1989-96, 47% involve pre-renounced shares (compared with 28% of rights issues from 
the same period) and the mean of the proportions of new shares taken up by the shareholders 
entitled to them is only 48% (Armitage, 2002). Thus, in the first half of the 1990s, the time 
when open offers were ‘catching on’, they were more popular than rights issues amongst 
companies with pre-renouncing shareholders, despite the fact that it is the non-subscribing 
shareholders who appear to lose out in an open offer compared with an equivalent rights 
issue.  
 Recognition that large shareholders can not sell their rights without incurring 
substantial cost can explain why a non-subscribing blockholder would not object to an open 
offer. Such a blockholder will be indifferent between a given rights issue and the 
corresponding ‘breakeven’ open offer, one that raises the same amount of new equity and is 
made at a discount such that the non-subscriber loses the same amount in the open offer as in 
the rights issue. In most rights issues the discount to the pre-announcement market price in the 
breakeven open offer works out to be a little over half of the rights issue discount. The exact 
breakeven discount depends on the terms of the rights issue, and is given by (Pmid,AD–1 – Div – 
Popen)/(Pmid,AD–1  – Div), where 
 Popen  =  Y(Pmid,AD–1 – Div – L)/(LNold + Y) (7) 
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Pmid,AD–1 is the pre-announcement share price, which is the same for both rights issue and 
open offer; Popen is the offer price in the breakeven open offer; Y is the equity raised in the 
rights issue (NnewPoffer) and in the breakeven open offer; and L is the estimated loss per old 
share on selling the rights in the rights issue. Our baseline estimate of L is [TERPAD–1 – Div – 
(Poffer + Pright)]Nnew/Nold. Note that if L is zero, the discount in the breakeven open offer is 
zero. Equation (7) is found by solving for Popen and Nopen in the simultaneous equations 
 Pmid,AD–1  –  TERPopen = L (8) 
 PopenNopen = Y (9) 
where TERPopen  =  [PAD–1Nold + (Popen + Div)Nopen]/(Nold + Nopen) and Nopen is the number of 
new shares in the breakeven open offer. Equation (8) sets the loss per share incurred by a non-
subscribing large shareholder in the rights issue to be equal in the open offer, and (9) sets the 
amount of equity raised to be equal. Table 3 shows the discounts in the breakeven open offers 
for a range of hypothetical rights issues. It can be seen by comparing columns 7 and 11 that 
the breakeven discount is a little over half of the rights issue discount in all cases except for 
the rights issue at a very deep discount of 80%. 
 
Table 3 around here 
 
 Equation (7) can be used to calculate the discounts in the breakeven open offers for the 
rights issues in our sample. The mean breakeven discount is 12.5% (median 10.0%). Thus, for 
the median rights issue, a non-subscribing large shareholder would have preferred the 
alternative of an open offer at any discount smaller than 10.0%. Such a discount is normal in 
an open offer.11 
                                                 
11 Listing Rule 4.26 states that an open offer can not be made at a discount of more than 10% in 
relation to the pre-announcement midpoint market price, unless the issuer is in severe financial 
difficulties or there are other exceptional circumstances. The rule does not apply to USM/AIM 
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 The pre-renounce-and-place route may not always have been preferable for non-
subscribers in rights issues. In Marsh’s (1977) sample of 1,237 rights issues made during 
1963-75, only 1% of the issues feature pre-renounced shares. The proportion is 13% in Slovin 
et al’s (2000) sample of 183 rights issues during 1982-85. For the current study, the 
proportion of rights issues found to have pre-renounced shares increases from 26% for 1987-
94 to 47% for 1995-2001, and the renounced shares were privately placed in 59% of these 
cases. One interpretation is that selling rights on the market was almost always cheaper in the 
1960s and 70s than arranging a pre-announcement private placing, even for large blocks, but 
that the position reversed during the 1980s. Alternatively, pre-renouncements and placings 
may not have been disclosed until the 1980s.  
 
6. Reasons for the discount  
 Several previous studies have reported that private placings of new shares are made at 
substantial discounts to the prevailing market price. A variety of explanations has been 
offered. The discount could be compensation for future costs of intervention by active placees 
(Wruck, 1989); or compensation for costs to the placee of investigating the issuer and 
certifying its value (Hertzel and Smith, 1993); or merely compensation for uncertainty about 
the issuer’s value (Altinciliç and Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003); placements of restricted stock 
could be discounted in part because of the impaired liquidity of restricted stock (Bajaj et al, 
2001; Silber, 1991); issuers may be overvalued at the time of the placement, with the 
placement price discounted because the price reflects the fair value of the shares (Barclay et 
al, 2003; Hertzel et al, 2002); discounts benefit managers when they are used to attract placees 
who will support the managers, and when the discounted shares are bought by the managers 
themselves (the management entrenchment hypothesis: Barclay et al, 2003; Wu, 2004). There 
                                                                                                                                                        
companies. Armitage (2002) reports that the mean discount to the pre-announcement market price in 
his sample of 393 open offers is 13.0% (median 7.8%). 
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is also the possibility that the demand curve is inelastic; evidence of various types is 
accumulating that supply and demand schedules for shares are inelastic (eg Corwin, 2003; 
Kalay et al, 2004). 
 Some of the above explanations are likely to apply with reduced force or not at all in 
the case of our pre-renounced shares. First, the placees are found by the issuer’s broker and 
merchant bank, and are not chosen by the managers. All the pre-renounced shares and rights 
in an issue are placed at the same price, so no discrimination between placees is possible, 
unlike in US private placements. Also, in none of our sample are the directors placees for any 
of the pre-renounced shares (they are placees in some of the excluded issues). These points 
tell against the management entrenchment hypothesis. Second, there are no restrictions on 
trading the new shares, which are identical to the existing shares unless they differ in dividend 
entitlement. Third, the placees are institutional investors that are unlikely to intervene in the 
direction of the company, and so are unlikely to require compensation for being active 
shareholders. Wruck (1989) suggests that in the majority of her US private placements the 
buyers serve as catalysts that increase market value. But in 58% of her sample there is only 
one buyer; the maximum number of buyers is six; and 78% of the disclosed buyers are 
individuals or corporations. Similarly, the placees in Barclay and Holderness’ (1989) sample 
of secondary placements are thought mostly to be active and all are either corporations or 
individuals. Bethel et al (1998, p. 611) classify placees as active if they publicly state that they 
are active, and this group seems to consist of prominent individual investors, not institutions. 
 
6.1 Market reaction 
 Evidence on the certification hypothesis can be obtained from the abnormal returns on 
the announcement of offers. If placees certify value, we might expect the average abnormal 
return (AAR) to be positive, as is the case for US and UK stand-alone private placements. The 
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two-day AAR on announcement of the rights issues in our sample is –1.08% (median             
–0.94%), which is significantly less than zero at the 10% level (t-statistic = –1.78); 63% of the 
abnormal returns are negative.12 This AAR is close to the findings of previous studies. For a 
sample of rights issues from 1982-85, Slovin et al (2000) report two-day AARs of –1.99% for 
24 issues with pre-renounced shares and –1.86% for 159 other issues, the difference being 
statistically insignificant. For their sample from 1986-94, the AAR is –8.59% for 20 issues 
with pre-renouncements and –2.29% for 180 other issues. The difference is significant at the 
5% level, but the –8.59% figure may be a quirk of the small sample. Armitage (2002) reports 
a mean two-day AAR of –1.63% for 209 rights issues with pre-renounced shares during 1985-
96 compared with a mean AAR of –2.49% for 493 other rights issues, and the difference is 
not significant. These results indicate that the short-term reaction to rights issues with pre-
renouncements is negative and is probably not significantly different from the reaction to 
issues without pre-renouncements. They provide little support for the hypothesis that the 
placing of pre-renounced shares provides a certification benefit. 
 
6.2 Long-run abnormal returns 
 The remaining explanations for the placing discount are price uncertainty, inelastic 
demand and overvaluation amongst issuers. Regarding overvaluation, the argument is that the 
price which the placees are willing to pay for an issuer’s shares plus rights reflects a valuation 
of the issuer that is better informed and more realistic than is the market price. The main 
support for the overvaluation hypothesis is the evidence of substantial negative long-run 
abnormal returns and operating performance following US private placements (Hertzel et al, 
2002). Underperformance has also been found following UK rights issues (Capstaff et al, 
                                                 
12 The two-day abnormal return ARjt,t+1 for a given share j for days t and t+1 is calculated using the 
simple index model: ARjt,t+1  =  Rjt,t+1 – RMt,t+1, where Rjt,t+1 and RMt,t+1 are the continuously compounded 
two-day returns on share j and the FTSE All-Share Index, respectively. The t-statistic is given by 
√n(mean(ARjt,t+1))/std dev(ARjt,t+1). The sample size for the abnormal returns, n, is 184. 
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2006; Ho 2005). It is plausible that placees for pre-renounced shares in the UK will have 
access to private information, so they could be better informed than other investors, as in US 
private placements. An awkward point for the overvaluation hypothesis is that in our sample 
the market price of the old shares does not fall to the placing price of the new shares plus 
rights (and market prices rise on average on news of US private placements). This is despite 
the fact that market investors know the placing price and know that the placees have access to 
private information. 
 To check whether perceived overvaluation of issuers could explain the placing 
discounts, we estimate long-run abnormal returns following the sample rights issues. The 
methodology used is similar to that in Capstaff et al (2006), and is discussed more fully there. 
In brief, the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) between dates 0 and T for firm j, ARj,T is 
estimated by 
 ARj,T  = Rj,T  –  Rjmatch,T (10) 
where date 0 is first day of the month following the announcement date of the issue, date T is 
the first day of any subsequent month up to 60 months, Rj,T is the buy-and-hold return on 
share j, and Rjmatch,T is the buy-and-hold return on a matched or benchmark share for j. 
Dividends are included using the Datastream item ‘dividend yield’. The return for a given 
month t, Rj,t, is given by 
 Rj,t  = (Pj,t – Pj,t–1)/Pj,t–1  +  (1 + Yldj,t)1/12  –  1 (11) 
where Pj,t is the price at the end of month t adjusted for subsequent capital changes such as 
scrip issues, and Yldj,t is the dividend yield. The yield as shown in Datastream is a number 
rather than a percentage, so it needs to be divided by 100. If j was delisted before the 60th 
month after the issue, the abnormal return is taken to be zero after the date of delisting. 
 Matches are found according size, size and industry, and size and book-to-market 
ratio. The matching firm by size is the firm with the nearest market capitalisation to that of 
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firm j six weeks after the announcement date, so that the offer proceeds are included in j’s 
market capitalisation. The matching firm by size and industry is found in the same way, but 
with the pool of potential matches restricted to firms in the same business sector as j, as 
described by Datastream. The matching firm by size and book-to-market is the firm with the 
next book-to-market ratio above that of j as at six weeks after the announcement, with the 
pool of potential matches restricted to firms with a market capitalisation within ±30% of that 
of j. The market-to-book ratio is taken from Datastream and inverted; book value is given by 
ordinary shareholders’ funds less the balance sheet value of intangible assets, as at the 
company’s most recent year-end. Companies that are in the sample of issues with pre-
renounced shares are excluded from the samples of potential matches. Some of the sample 
show very large changes in BHARs from one month to the next. To alleviate the impact of 
outliers, results are reported for samples excluding the most volatile 5% of BHARs. Volatility 
for a given share is measured by the standard deviation of the BHARs across the 60 months. 
 
Table 4 and Figure 2 around here. 
  
 The results are shown in Table 4 and Figure 2. The results are similar matching by 
size and by size and industry, but somewhat different matching by size and book-to-market. 
The mean BHARs are positive initially, reaching a peak after about six months. They then 
drift downwards but do not become consistently negative until month 36 for size and size-
and-industry matching, or month 17 for size-and-book-to-market matching. They flatten out 
or become less negative towards the end of the 60 months. They are only significantly 
different from zero for the first few months, using a standard t-test, so they are not significant 
for months 12, 36 or 60, for any of the matches. But the mean BHARs are significantly 
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negative at the 5% level for months 36 and 60 matching by size and book-to-market, using the 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test.13 
 Mean BHARs after three years are between +0.7% and –19.6%, depending on the 
matching. In comparison, Hertzel et al (2002, p. 2603) report significant mean BHARs of 
between –23.8% and –45.2% after three years following US private placements. Capstaff et al 
(2006) report mean BHARs following UK rights issues which are more negative than ours 
and are significant after the first few months. They lie between –25.1% and –27.6% after 
three years. The mean BHARs after three years in Ho (2005, p. 38) are also significant but are 
more in line with our estimates, lying between –8.5% and –19.5%. Ho’s long-run abnormal 
returns estimated using a calendar-time approach and multifactor models are only slightly 
negative and are not significant.  
 The existing evidence from long-run abnormal returns estimated using matching firms 
indicates that UK companies are overvalued, on average, when they make a rights issue. The 
evidence presented here using the same methodology indicates that companies making a 
rights issues with pre-renounced shares are fairly valued, or at least are not clearly 
overvalued, at the time of the issue. Comparison of our results with those of Capstaff et al and 
Ho suggests that it is companies making rights issues without privately placed pre-renounced 
shares that tend to be overvalued. The evidence does not support the hypothesis that placing 
discounts arise because issuers with pre-renounced shares are overvalued. 
 
6.3 Regression analysis of placing discounts 
 It has been argued that the depth of discount should be positively related to the 
difficulty of valuing the issuer and to the cost of placing shares, and negatively related to the 
                                                 
13 The results for the full samples show a similar but more erratic pattern of positive mean BHARs for 
the first 18 months or more, followed by negative numbers. None of the means are significant for 
months 12, 36 or 60. 
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elasticity of demand for the shares. These explanations are closely linked. A share which is 
relatively difficult to value could, for that reason, have relatively inelastic supply and demand 
schedules, reflecting dispersion in investors’ reservation sell and buy prices. Again, Altinciliç 
and Hansen (2003, p. 286) describe the cost of placing shares as a cost required ‘to attract 
capital suppliers and compensate them for bearing the burden of more illiquidity of longer 
term investing’. The difficulty of attracting capital suppliers will presumably be related both 
to the difficulty of valuation and to the lack of elasticity of demand. 
 This section presents a test of whether the placing discounts reflect price uncertainty, 
inelastic demand or the overvaluation of issuers. The placing discount is regressed on the half-
touch for the relevant shares (half-touch). A wider touch could be due both to greater 
information asymmetry and to less elastic supply and demand, so the discount should be 
positively related to half-touch if it is due to uncertainty or to inelastic demand. The discount 
is also regressed on the number of privately placed shares as a proportion of the existing 
shares (relative size). This variable should be significant if demand elasticity affects placing 
discounts. The placed shares consist of those pre-renounced together with shares in an 
accompanying private placing, if any, or secondary placing on behalf of an existing 
shareholder, if any. The results are similar if only the shares pre-renounced are included. The 
placing discount should not be related to either of these variables if the discounts are due to 
overvaluation.14 
 The results are reported in Table 5. The full sample with available data excludes the 
seven issues with small placing discounts to TERPAD–1 of less than 2% and the eight with 
deep discounts of more than 20%; the sample with known placing prices excludes the three 
discounts of less than 2% and the seven of more than 20%. The results for the samples 
                                                 
14 Unless one takes the view that the extent of the overvaluation should be negatively related to the 
extent of public information about the issuer, for which half-touch is a proxy. However, Hertzel et al 
(2002) find the overvaluation in private placements not to be significantly related to the size of the 
company, which is also a proxy for public information. 
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without the exclusions are qualitatively similar to those reported, but the explanatory power of 
the regressions is much lower. 
 
Table 5 around here 
 
 The placing discount in relation to TERPAD–1 is significantly related at the 1% level to 
half-touch in both the full sample and the sample with known placing prices for the rights. 
The discount is significantly related at the 5% level to relative size in the sample with known 
placing prices only. The adjusted R2 for the sample with known placing prices is 0.33, 
compared with 0.20 for the full sample. When the placing discount in relation to TERPAD is 
used as the dependent variable, the R2 values are much lower. Half-touch remains highly 
significant in both samples but relative size is not significant. 
 An alternative measure of the placing discount is the discount of the actual price per 
right to the regulatory maximum, given by Rightmax  =  0.5(TERPAD–1 – Div – Poffer). The 
discount to Rightmax is (Rightmax – Pright)/Rightmax. The results reinforce those for the 
regressions with placing discount as the dependent variable. Both half-touch and relative size 
are significantly related to the discount to Rightmax at the 1% level. The adjusted R2 of the 
regression is 0.42. 
 We experimented with three other variables that have been used in previous studies as 
proxies for price uncertainty and information asymmetry, namely the log of the market 
capitalisation of the issuer before the announcement, the log of the share price before the 
announcement, and the standard deviation of the daily returns on the share. These variables all 
have significant coefficients with the predicted signs in univariate regressions. But they are all 
highly correlated with half-touch and with each other, and their inclusion adds very little to 
the R2 of the regressions reported. 
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 The explanatory power of the two independent variables, especially half-touch, is 
evidence that price uncertainty and probably inelastic demand are factors in setting the 
placing discount, and is further evidence against overvaluation. The better goodness of fit 
when the discount in relation to TERPAD–1 is the dependent variable suggests that the 
expected market price used in setting the offer price and rights placing price is TERPAD–1 
rather than TERPAD. The better goodness of fit for the sample with known placing prices, and 
the fact that the discount to Rightmax is related to half-touch and relative size, indicate that the 
independent variables have an incremental effect on the actual rights placing price, over and 
above any effect they have on the offer price. 
 
6.4 Large block sales of existing shares 
 If the reason for the placing discount is uncertainty about issuer value or inelastic 
demand, we might expect shareholders seeking to sell very large blocks of existing shares to 
passive investors to face similar costs of sale, although it is arguable that uncertainty about 
value will be greater at the time of an equity issue than at other times. The microstructure 
literature partitions the cost of a trade into a permanent price impact, measured by the 
difference between the midpoint price at the time of the trade and a post-trade price shortly 
afterwards, and a temporary impact, measured by the difference between the post-trade price 
and the price of the trade. The permanent impact is viewed as a measure of the effect of the 
new information about the share price implied by the trade, and the temporary impact is 
viewed as a measure the ‘liquidity cost’, ie the gain for the liquidity-supplying counterparty. 
The cost of selling pre-renounced shares plus rights is mainly a gain for the buyers. Could the 
typical liquidity cost of selling a very large block of existing shares to passive investors be 
around 8% of the market price, or six times the half-touch?  
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 Existing evidence on this question is scarce, because it is difficult to measure the cost 
facing a seller of a very large block of existing shares. The shareholder may choose to sell via 
a sequence of sales of smaller blocks. This makes it impossible to estimate the costs of selling 
the total block, unless the intentions of a given investor are known.15 Sales of intact large 
blocks do not provide clean evidence on the cost of a trade initiated by the seller. This is 
because it is uncertain whether a given sale of a block was initiated by the seller, or whether it 
was the counterparty trade in a transaction initiated by the buyer. In the latter case the seller 
was supplying liquidity, and for a trade of a given number of shares at a given time, a seller 
who is supplying liquidity can be expected to receive a better price than a seller who is 
demanding liquidity. 
 There is no UK evidence on the costs of selling large blocks of five per cent or more 
of the relevant firm’s equity. Board and Sutcliffe (1996), Naik and Yadav (1999) and others 
find that, for most of the range of observed trade sizes, the quality of execution improves as 
block size increases (average trade prices move further within the touch). They note that the 
very largest blocks trade outside the touch, but there is no evidence on how far outside. 
 Several papers study secondary placements of five per cent or more of the equity in 
the USA. In at least two thirds of such placements, the price at which the shares are placed is 
at a substantial premium to the prevailing market price. The probable reason why the buyers 
are willing to pay a premium is that they are active investors who anticipate using, and do go 
on to use, the control or influence from their large shareholding to improve company 
performance and to extract private benefits that will not accrue to other shareholders (Barclay 
and Holderness, 1989; Barclay et al, 2003; Bethel at al, 1998). Signs of blockholder 
intervention after purchase of the block include asset sales, share repurchases, replacement of 
senior executives and improvements in operating performance. A seller who can find an 
                                                 
15 As they are in Keim and Madhavan (1997). However, the blocks in their sample are very much 
smaller than the blocks studied here, both in absolute size and in relation to the equity of the company. 
 31 
active buyer willing to pay a premium apparently faces a negative cost for the sale. However, 
it is likely that most of the secondary placements transacted at a premium are initiated by the 
buyer rather than the seller. 
 A US study by Keim and Madhavan (1996) is of interest. The sample consists of block 
trades in shares with a market capitalisation below the prevailing median on the NYSE. The 
counterparty in every case is a passive fund which specialises in providing liquidity for 
upstairs trades in smaller stocks only. So the sample consists of trades in relatively illiquid 
shares, in which the initiator of each trade is known for certain. For the quintile of the largest 
block sales, accounting for between 0.8% and 7.9% of the equity outstanding, the mean 
temporary impact is –4.6%, ie a liquidity cost of 4.6%. 
 In summary, there is little evidence on the cost of selling very large blocks of illiquid 
shares to passive investors. The evidence of Keim and Madhavan (1996) indicates that the 
liquidity cost is several percent of the market price, and our evidence supports this. We are 
suggesting that a discount of several per cent is not a feature peculiar to private placings of 
new equity, but would arise in an attempt to sell a very large block of existing or new equity 
to passive investors via the normal trading process. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 The paper uses evidence from pre-renouncements of new shares in rights issues to 
estimate the cost of selling very large blocks of shares plus rights to passive investors. The 
average cost is between 7.6% and 9.6% of the midpoint market price of the existing shares, 
depending on the assumptions made. This is a substantial ‘hidden’ cost in the rights issue 
method for issuers with one or more large shareholders who do not wish to subscribe for the 
new shares, and with no special buyer willing to buy the renounced shares plus rights en bloc 
at a favourable price. It is true that an open offer to raise the same amount of new equity will 
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not necessarily reduce the cost of the issue to a large non-subscribing shareholder. But 
recognition that there is a substantial cost to selling shares plus rights explains why such a 
shareholder need not prefer a rights issue, and helps to explain the apparently odd fact that the 
proportion of open offers with pre-renouncing shareholders is higher than the proportion of 
rights issues. 
 The findings raise the question of why a substantial discount is needed to sell large 
blocks of shares plus rights. The explanations best supported by the evidence are uncertainty 
about the value of the issuer and inelastic demand for the shares. Estimated long-run abnormal 
returns following the rights issues with pre-renounced shares are not consistently or 
significantly negative, indicating that perceived overvaluation of the issuer is unlikely to be 
the reason for the placing discounts. The depth of the discount is positively related to the half-
touch and to the amount pre-renounced as a proportion of the existing shares. If the discounts 
in block sales of new shares plus rights are due to uncertainty and inelasticity, these 
explanations ought also to apply to block sales of existing shares to passive investors. If so, 
we would expect costs of sale similar to those reported in this paper. There is no existing 
evidence on the cost of selling very large blocks of existing shares in the UK, and this cost 
would be worth investigating. It would also be interesting to know why pre-renounced and 
placed shares in rights issues were virtually non-existent in the 1960s and 70s, but had 
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Table 1. Descriptive data 
 
The table shows descriptive data for 186 rights issues made during 1987-2001 with pre-
renounced shares that were privately placed. Gross proceeds = number of new shares × offer 
price gross of fees; amount pre-renounced = number of shares recorded as pre-renounced in 
the prospectus × offer price; market capitalisation of issuer = number of existing shares × 
midpoint market price as at close of day before offer announcement (Pmid,AD–1); half-touch of 
issuer’s shares = (Pask – Pbid)/(Pask + Pbid) given by the mean half-touch across the first five 
trading days of the month before the month of the offer announcement, where Pask and Pbid 
are the market makers’ best ask and bid quotes, respectively; discount to Pmid,AD–1 = (Pmid,AD–1 
– Div – Poffer)/(Pmid,AD–1 – Div ), where Div = next dividend if new shares are not entitled to it. 
Sample for half-touch is 152 issues due to unavailable data. Sources: prospectuses; 
Datastream for Pask and Pbid, and for Pmid,AD–1 if not in prospectus. 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
 
Gross proceeds (£000) £15,895 £8,496 £291 £125,229 
 
Amount pre-renounced (£000) £6,001 £3,146 £106 £41,827 
 
Shares pre-renounced (000) 9,816 3,520 305 384,377 
 
     as % of new shares issued 42.3% 39.7% 13.3% 79.8% 
 
     as % of existing shares 24.5% 13.4% 3.3% 738.8% 
 
     as % of existing plus new shares 12.3% 9.5% 2.9% 54.1% 
 
Mkt capitalisation of issuer (£000) £60,971 £32,914 £635 £790,558 
 
Half-touch of issuer’s shares  2.26% 1.55% 0.21% 12.84% 
 
Offer price of new shares 142.4p 106.0p 2.0p 650.0p 
 
Placing price of rights 8.5p 4.8p 0.0p 50.0p 
 




Number of issues with shares renounced by 
   Directors 115 
   Mixture of directors and other shareholders 54 
   Other shareholders only 17 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2. Placing discount of pre-renounced shares plus rights  
to the expected ex-rights midpoint price 
 
The proxies for the expected ex-rights price are TERPAD–1 and TERPAD. TERPAD–1 =  
[Pmid,AD–1Nold + (Poffer + Div)Nnew]/(Nold + Nnew), where Nold = number of old shares, Nnew = 
number of new shares, Poffer = offer price. TERPAD uses midpoint price for announcement day 
instead of Pmid,AD–1. The placing discount in relation to TERPAD–1 is [TERPAD–1 – Div – (Pright 
+ Poffer)]/(TERPAD–1 – Div), where Pright is the stated or inferred placing price of the rights. 
Other terms are as in Table 1. Sample numbers vary due to missing data. 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A Mean Median Min Max 
 % % % % N 
Discount in relation to TERPAD–1  
     Full sample 8.72 7.33 –2.56 36.19 186 
 
     Sample with placing price known 9.62 7.92 –1.39 36.19 131 
 
Discount in relation to TERPAD 
     Full sample 8.29 6.95 –6.54 38.65 184 
 
     Sample with placing price known 9.36 7.62 –3.62 38.65 129 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B Mean Median Min Max  
 × × × × N 
Discount in relation to TERPAD–1  
as a multiple of half-touch 
     Full sample 7.01 5.11 –1.09 80.58 152 
 
     Sample with placing price known 8.32 5.87 –1.09 80.58 105 
 
Discount in relation to TERPAD 
as a multiple of half-touch 
     Full sample 6.92 4.20 –1.65 86.07 152 
 
     Sample with placing price known 8.37 5.56 –1.65 86.07 105 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel C Mean Median Min Max  
 % % % % N 
Discount in relation to TERPAD–1  
net of fee saved by pre-renouncing 
     Full sample 8.08 6.45 –3.59 35.23 174 
 
     Sample with placing price known 8.95 7.28 –1.67 35.23 123 
 
Discount in relation to TERPAD  
net of fee saved by pre-renouncing 
     Full sample 7.61 6.20 –6.84 37.73 172 
 




Hypothetical rights issues and their breakeven open offers  
 
The first five columns show the terms of hypothetical rights issues with varying discount, ratio of new to old equity and entitlement of the new 
shares to dividend. Columns 8 and 9 show, respectively, what the offer price and number of new shares must be in a breakeven open offer which 
has the same loss per old share for a non-subscribing shareholder and raises the same amount of equity as the rights issue in the same row. 
Column 12 shows the loss per share in the rights issue, L, calculated on the basis that the non-subscriber loses 0.5(TERPAD–1 – Div – 
Poffer)Nnew/Nold per share. The loss per share in the open offer is given by PAD–1 – TERPopen and is the same number by design as for the rights 
issue. TERPopen  =  [Pmid,AD–1Nold + (Popen+ Div)Nopen]/(Nold + Nopen); Popen  =  offer price in breakeven open offer; Nopen  =  number of new 
shares in open offer. Popen is given by Y(PAD–1 – Div – L)/(LNold + Y) and Nopen is given by  Y/Popen, where Y  =  NnewPoffer. See Section 5.2 for 
derivation of formula for Popen. Other terms are as in previous tables. 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Rights issue Breakeven open offer  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
       Discount    Discount Loss 
      TERP to    TERP to per 
 Pmid,AD–1 Nold Poffer Nnew Div AD–1 Pmid,AD–1 Popen Nopen open Pmid,AD–1 share 
 
 £10 100 £2 50 £0.0 £7.33 80.0% £3.71 26.92 £8.67 62.9% £1.33 
 £10 100 £7 50 £0.0 £9.00 30.0% £8.31 42.11 £9.50 16.9% £0.50 
 £10 100 £8 50 £0.0 £9.33 20.0% £8.92 44.83 £9.67 10.8% £0.33 
 £10 100 £8 50 £0.5 £9.50 15.8% £8.71 45.95 £9.75 8.4% £0.25 
 £10 100 £9 50 £0.0 £9.67 10.0% £9.48 47.46 £9.83 5.2% £0.17 
 £10 100 £8 10 £0.0 £9.82 20.0% £8.90 8.99 £9.91 11.0% £0.09 
 £10 100 £8 100 £0.0 £9.00 20.0% £8.94 89.47 £9.50 10.6% £0.50 
 £10 100 £8 1000 £0.0 £8.18 20.0% £8.99 890.00 £9.09 10.1% £0.91 




Long-run abnormal returns 
 
The table shows mean and median abnormal returns for periods of one, three and five years 
from the months after the announcement dates of the sample issues. The abnormal return for 
firm j over a given period is estimated by the buy-and-hold return for j minus the buy-and-
hold return for a firm matched to j according to size, size and industry, or size and book-to-
market ratio. Sample numbers vary because of missing data in Datastream and because some 
of the sample are delisted before the end of the 60 months after the issue. To alleviate the 
impact of outliers, results are reported for samples excluding the most volatile 5% of BHARs. 
None of the mean BHARs is significant according to t-statistics given by t  =  
√n[µ(ARj,T)/σ(ARj,T)], where µ(ARj,T) is the mean of the BHARs for the n shares in the 
sample j  =  1, ... n for month T, and σ(ARj,T) is the standard deviation of the cross-section of 
BHARs for month T. The equality of the distributions of issuer and matching buy-and-hold 
returns is also measured by a Z-statistic that is the test statistic in the Wilcoxon matched-pairs 
signed-rank test, as in Loughran and Ritter (1997). ZT  =  [DT – n(n + 1)/4]/√[n(n + 1)(2n + 
1)/24]. DT is computed by ranking the absolute values of the BHARs for month T and then 
summing the ranks of the positive BHARs. 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Mean Median Proportion Wilcoxon 
Holding period BHAR BHAR negative Z-statistic N 
 
1 year: matching by  
Size 3.7% 2.5% 0.48 0.28 168 
Size and industry 3.8% 4.8% 0.46 1.07 167 
Size and book/market 5.8% –1.4% 0.51 –1.10 148 
 
3 years: matching by 
Size 0.6% –8.5% 0.54 –1.04 150 
Size and industry –2.4% –9.2% 0.54 –0.90 149 
Size and book/market –15.0% –20.8% 0.60 –2.29 134 
 
5 years: matching by 
Size –13.9% –16.1% 0.57 –1.52 124 
Size and industry –10.0% –8.5% 0.54 –0.83 124 







The table shows OLS regression coefficients for regressions of the discount of the placing 
price of pre-renounced shares plus rights on the half-touch for the relevant share (half-touch) 
and the shares pre-renounced or otherwise privately placed as a proportion of the old shares 
(relative size). Also shown is a regression in which the dependent variable is the discount to 
the regulatory maximum rights price, Rightmax, for issues with the rights placing price known. 
Rightmax  =  0.5(TERPAD–1 – Div – Poffer). t-statistics are in italics, using standard errors with 
White’s correction for heteroscedasticity. The sample numbers are smaller than in Table 2 due 
to missing data and because issues with discounts to TERPAD–1 smaller than 2% and deeper 
than 20% are excluded. 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Dependent 
  variable: 
  placing   Relative Adjusted 
Sample  discount to Constant Half-touch size R2 N 
 
All  TERPAD–1 0.063 0.756 0.018 0.20 137 
   13.40 4.64 0.87 
 
Rights price  TERPAD–1 0.060 1.016 0.048 0.33 95 
known   11.04 5.59 2.15  
 
  Rightmax –0.000 0.806 0.049 0.42 95 
   –0.02 6.77 3.62 
 
All  TERPAD 0.065 0.594 –0.004 0.09 124 
   11.76 3.64 –0.21 
 
Rights price  TERPAD 0.064 0.889 0.014 0.19 87 






The figure shows the frequency of 186 placing discounts of pre-renounced shares plus rights 
by depth of discount. The discounts are in relation to TERPAD–1. 
 






















The figure shows average buy-and-hold abnormal returns following issue announcements, 
calculated as in Table 4. 
 










1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59
Months after announcement
Matched by size Matched by size and industry Matched by size and book-to-market  
 
